Listing 1 - 10 of 50 | << page >> |
Sort by
|
Choose an application
Federal regulatory agencies are often assumed to be excessively responsive to and influenced by the corporate interests they are supposed to regulate. On the basis of direct empirical examination, Paul Quirk challenges this assumption as it relates to four United States federal regulatory agencies. Through a series of interviews with high-level officials of the Federal Trade Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, he determines whether and what kinds of incentives exist to adopt policies favorable to industry.Originally published in 1981.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Choose an application
Industrial policy -- United States --- United States -- Commerce --- Monroe
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Marketing --- Product management --- Industrial policy --- Produits commerciaux --- Politique industrielle --- Gestion --- Product management. --- Marketing - United States --- Industrial policy - United States
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Industrial policy --- Price regulation --- Welfare state --- United States --- Economic policy --- Welfare state. --- Industrial policy - United States --- Price regulation - United States --- United States - Economic policy
Choose an application
Listing 1 - 10 of 50 | << page >> |
Sort by
|